The Next 15 Years Of Power And Industry In Australia

1. A Nation at an Energy Crossroads.

Australia’s recent economic data reveals significant stress. Over 25,000 businesses entered insolvency between mid-2023 and mid-2025, as confirmed by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). For thousands of manufacturers, rising energy prices contributed to business failure.

Electricity prices surged approximately 27% above consumer inflation across this two-year period, driven by wholesale market volatility, network constraints and the global energy shock that forced domestic gas prices upward.

This shock coincided with record interest rates and high input costs, creating what some economists now describe as a “triple threat” to Australian industry.

By 2025, manufacturing’s GDP share reached a record low of just above 5%. Australia risked becoming not merely post-industrial, but de-industrialised.

Factories curtailed operations, smelters reduced output and advanced manufacturing projects shifted offshore.

Discussions about the country’s energy future concern the economic foundation of the nation itself.

2. The Case for a Firming Backbone.

Electricity drives every segment of industrial growth. For heavy industry, firm, dispatchable baseload power matters most, generation that runs continuously at predictable cost.

Renewable energy can provide low-cost kilowatt-hours under favourable conditions, but its intermittency requires balancing through firming technologies such as pumped hydro, gas turbine systems, compressed air storage, or nuclear power.

In the Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO) 2024 Integrated System Plan (ISP), firming was identified as essential for system reliability.

Even under high renewable, net-zero scenarios, AEMO forecasts that firming capacity from gas, hydro and storage must roughly quadruple by 2040 to offset the retirement of 90% of the existing coal fleet.

That transition presents challenges. The US, UK and Japan have experienced that removing dispatchable generation faster than firm replacement capacity can trigger instability, blackouts, or inflationary price spikes.

Australia shows early symptoms of similar strain. The response requires building a realistic bridge using high-efficiency coal and gas at appropriate sites, upgraded hydro where geography allows and a deliberate pivot to nuclear energy as the long-term anchor.

3. Bridging to the 2040s: AUSC, HELE and Gas.

Between now and the early 2040s, high-efficiency low-emissions (HELE) coal, advanced ultra-supercritical (AUSC) systems and open-cycle gas turbines will remain central to ensuring continuous supply.

These technologies deliver large-scale firming power at relatively low capital cost and high efficiency.

They also preserve valuable labour skills, supply chains and grid topology while the next generation of baseload, particularly nuclear, ramps up.

Policymakers should consider treating modern fossil assets as transitional infrastructure essential for industrial continuity rather than as competitors to decarbonisation.

The approach requires appropriate timing and structure. Australia should selectively keep existing plants online where safe and economic, retrofit them for efficiency or emissions improvements and concentrate investment in regions already zoned and grid-connected for heavy generation.

These upgrades act as insurance, protecting the nation’s manufacturing base while longer-term zero-carbon options mature.

4. The Long Road to a Nuclear Option.

Nuclear power is the only zero-operational-emission technology currently proven to provide dense, continuous baseload output.

Its global record, 90%+ capacity factors and multiple 60-year operational lifespans, demonstrates performance. Deployment in Australia is complicated not by engineering but by governance, law and time.

Two pieces of legislation currently prevent progress:

1.       The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998, which prohibits the Commonwealth from authorising construction of nuclear power facilities.

2.       The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act 1999, which specifically bans such facilities under environmental law.

Repealing or amending these involves parliamentary process, committee review and likely Senate inquiry. Even if federal bans were lifted, each state would need to modify its own prohibitions, which differ widely in scope.

Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland currently legislate against nuclear power plants. South Australia and Western Australia allow exploration of nuclear minerals but not generation.

Legislating a path forward means stepwise negotiation, one jurisdiction at a time, often tied to local community benefits and regional energy needs. International experience suggests this process alone can consume several years.

5. Building the Institutional Framework.

Beyond law, institutional architecture will define success. The most logical national structure builds upon Australia’s existing scientific and regulatory pillars:

1.       ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation) should evolve into the government’s central nuclear centre of excellence, responsible for technical expertise, reactor design knowledge and workforce training. Its 60 years of safe reactor operation at Lucas Heights provide a foundation.

2.       ARPANSA (Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency) must remain the independent, internationally aligned safety regulator. Its mission should be expanded to license civilian nuclear facilities under globally recognised standards such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

3.       CSIRO and AEMO should lead on system-wide costings and technology modelling. Through tools like GenCost and the Integrated System Plan, they must ensure that nuclear is evaluated on the same methodological footing as renewables, coal and gas.

This framework keeps oversight balanced: ANSTO provides expertise, ARPANSA ensures integrity and CSIRO and AEMO supply economic evidence.

Any federal government will surely turn to CSIRO for cost comparisons, so nuclear should be integrated responsibly into modeling rather than excluded.

6. The Legal and Political Roadmap.

The realistic pathway follows this sequence:

1.     Launch an Expert Review involving ANSTO, ARPANSA, CSIRO, AEMO and major industry partners to map viable reactor types, costs and siting options.

2.     Amend Federal Legislation to remove prohibitions under the ARPANS and EPBC Acts while ensuring ARPANSA’s authority is preserved.

3.     Negotiate with States to modify or repeal state bans through cooperative federalism, linking each change to potential local sites, economic benefits and job creation.

4.     Advance a First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) Project by selecting a site with existing heavy industrial infrastructure, for instance, a retiring coal station and progress through design, licensing, environmental assessment and financing.

Even with ideal coordination, the timeline from policy decision to first megawatt-hour of grid electricity is typically ten to fifteen years.

This aligns with the experience of nuclear newcomer nations such as Poland and the Czech Republic, which began their modern programs in the 2020s with first generation expected in the mid-2030s.

Fleet deployment, the stage where nuclear meaningfully shifts national cost and emissions profiles, typically follows another decade later. Delaying the outset of planning makes the task harder later.

7. Integrating Economics and Timelines.

Critics cite CSIRO’s GenCost analyses to argue that nuclear remains high-cost. In raw dollars per kilowatt-hour, small modular reactors (SMRs) are currently estimated 40-60% above renewables with storage.

However, those figures reflect assumption-heavy early designs without local supply chains or nuclear-ready regulation.  Historically, unit costs fall steeply once the first plants are built and local capabilities develop.

System value matters more than plant-only cost. A grid with intermittent renewables and insufficient firming experiences high volatility and curtailment, meaning periods of both surplus and scarcity, each expensive in different ways. Nuclear’s strength includes not only the energy it generates, but the stabilising effect it exerts on wholesale prices and industrial certainty.

Industrial investors, particularly in chemicals, hydrogen and critical minerals processing, value predictable energy above all.

For them, a megawatt of guaranteed supply is worth far more than a cheaper megawatt whose availability is uncertain.

8. Global Lessons in Energy Realism.

Other developed economies provide instructive examples:

1.       Poland is transitioning from coal to nuclear, targeting its first reactor by 2036 and achieving industrial-scale nuclear output by the mid-2040s.

2.       Canada’s Ontario province recently committed to multiple small modular reactors (SMRs) as both baseload and hydrogen feedstock sources, citing round-the-clock energy needs.

3.       South Korea and France have demonstrated that consistent nuclear programmes stabilise grid emissions and industrial electricity prices simultaneously over decades.

Australia has spent nearly 25 years officially prohibited from even considering nuclear generation.

That lost time is now being felt through escalating costs, declining competitiveness and dependence on imported components for emerging sectors like electric-vehicle batteries and green hydrogen.

9. Why Industry Should Care Now.

The argument for nuclear is industrial rather than ideological.

Without enormous, continuous electricity at competitive prices, large-scale manufacturing will remain uneconomic, regardless of tax incentives or sovereign capability policies.

Energy-intensive industries such as aluminium, steel, defence manufacturing and data processing require multi-gigawatt-hour reliability.

Storage and renewables are improving, but even optimistic projections rely on gigascale battery deployment, an undertaking that carries its own material and environmental challenges.

Australia’s path forward is not a binary choice between renewables and nuclear, or between gas and storage.

It is a sequence: renewables scale up where economic, transitional thermal capacity maintains stability and nuclear begins the next era of baseload assurance. In parallel, demand-side efficiencies and electrification expand but depend on the same fundamental, abundant, steady energy.

10. The Political Imperative.

The political challenge involves sequencing reform while keeping public trust. Nuclear debates can polarise communities, yet much hesitation stems from outdated imagery rather than evidence of performance.

Modern reactors are equipped with passive safety systems, inherently safe designs and multi-layer containment unmatched in previous generations.

Transparency is essential. By embedding ANSTO, ARPANSA, CSIRO, AEMO and independent experts in the process from the outset, Australia can conduct a fact-based conversation grounded in science, economics and public regulation.

Parliamentary inquiries, rather than being obstacles, become vehicles to build legitimacy and record the technical case for future parliaments.

11. Looking Fifteen Years Ahead.

If serious policy commitment were made during the current parliamentary term, by 2027, Australia could feasibly see its first operating reactor around 2038-2040. By then, almost all coal generation will be retired and reliable clean energy will define the survival of heavy industry.

A balanced energy portfolio in 2040 might include:

• Roughly 60-70% renewables (solar, wind, hydro).
• 10-20% flexible gas and storage.
• 10-20% nuclear baseload.

That mix can deliver both low emissions and system reliability, anchoring industrial hubs across the east coast and restoring confidence for long-life investments in refining, manufacturing and hydrogen production.

12. Coal Is The Bridge To Nuclear.

Building 10 brand new 3 to 4 GW Advanced Ultra‑Supercritical (AUSC) / HELE coal‑fired power stations, each comprising 3 to 4 high‑efficiency units, would give Australia a stable, affordable and strategically reliable energy backbone during the 10 to 15 years required for nuclear power to scale.

These plants act as a pragmatic transition technology, supporting the grid, protecting industry and buying time for long‑term zero‑emission options to mature.

12.1. Reliability Boost.

AUSC plants operate at 85%+ availability, delivering true baseload power that far outperforms Australia’s aging subcritical fleet or intermittent renewables without large‑scale storage.

With the existing coal fleet suffering 128 breakdowns in a single summer and units such as Gladstone running at 50% downtime, the construction of 10 x 3 to 4 GW AUSC stations (30–40 GW total) would:

1.       Replace retiring coal capacity before 2035.

2.       Add new firming capacity to support population and industrial growth.

3.       Reduce AEMO interventions that push wholesale prices higher.

Modern AUSC units can also ramp quickly, enabling smoother integration with solar and wind.

This flexibility becomes essential as AEMO’s 2024 ISP anticipates 90% of coal capacity retiring by the mid‑2030s, requiring a fourfold increase in firming resources.

12.2. Cost Stabilisation.

The LCOE of AUSC generation ($52–72/MWh) is well below recent wholesale price spikes above $120/MWh. For energy‑intensive industries, metals, chemicals, cement, fertilisers, this stability is critical, especially after 27% real electricity price increases since 2023 and more than 25,000 insolvencies linked to rising operating costs.

Higher thermal efficiency (up to 47.5%, compared with 30–35% for legacy units) reduces coal consumption by roughly 1 Mt per GW per year. Across ten 3–4 GW plants, this equates to 30–40 Mt of annual fuel savings, strengthening energy security by relying on domestic reserves rather than imports.

12.3. Emissions Reductions.

AUSC technology reduces emissions intensity by 30–40%, from around 986 kg/MWh (subcritical) to ~674 kg/MWh. Across 30–40 GW operating at 85% capacity factor, this represents:

·         ~70–95 Mt CO₂ avoided annually, depending on final capacity

·         Major reductions in NOx, SOx, particulates and mercury

·         Lower health‑related externalities, which legacy plants currently impose at an estimated $2.4B per year

Designing these stations as CCS‑ready future‑proofs them for carbon pricing and extends their operational relevance over the 40–50 year horizon while nuclear capacity ramps up.

12.4. Industrial and Economic Gains.

Locating new AUSC plants at retiring coal sites, such as those in north Queensland, minimises transmission upgrades and enables orderly phase‑out of inefficient units.

12.5. Strategic Bridge to Nuclear.

Under the proposed ANSTO–ARPANSA–CSIRO framework, Australia’s first nuclear output could potentially be expected around 2038–2040 (with a bit of luck most likely also required)

AUSC plants provide the firm thermal generation required to bridge this gap without immediate regulatory overhaul.

AEMO modelling indicates that firm thermal capacity remains essential to 2040, regardless of renewable penetration. Without it, Australia risks:

1.       Overbuilding renewables and storage by 50–120% to achieve equivalent reliability.

2.       Accelerating industrial decline due to volatile energy prices.

3.       Increasing reliance on gas peakers and imports.

AUSC therefore stabilises the system while governments progress nuclear legislation (ARPANS Act amendments, EPBC considerations) and negotiate state‑level approvals.

12.6. Risks and Mitigations.

1.       Capital Cost: AUSC requires $2–3B per GW, but competitive LCOE and long asset life offset upfront investment. Government guarantees or capacity mechanisms can de‑risk financing.

2.       Public Perception: Opposition often stems from legacy coal plants. Positioning AUSC as modern, high‑efficiency, 40% cleaner transitional infrastructure reframes the narrative.

3.       Build Time: AUSC plants can be delivered in 5–7 years, significantly faster than nuclear’s 10–15 year timeline, enabling rapid reinforcement of the grid.

Summary.

10 x 3 to 4 GW AUSC/HELE power stations would:

1.       Restore grid stability.

2.       Provide affordable electricity for industry.

3.       Reduce emissions and coal consumption.

4.       Support regional economies and skilled workforces.

5.       Create a reliable bridge to nuclear power.

This approach prevents further de‑industrialisation and ensures Australia maintains energy security while transitioning to long‑term zero‑emission technologies.

13. Balance: Industry, Environment, Prosperity & The Cost of Living.

This article has tried to outline a practical 15‑year pathway for Australia’s energy future, one shaped by realism rather than rigid ideology.

It reflects the author’s considered view that a sequenced transition can protect jobs, steady household bills, reduce emissions and support a stronger industrial base. It isn’t presented as a flawless blueprint; every energy strategy faces uncertainties, from global supply chains to shifting policy settings.

Even so, the underlying logic aims to speak to a broad set of interests: reliable power for industry, meaningful decarbonisation for the environment, more predictable costs for households and greater economic confidence for the nation.

The approach begins by acknowledging the pressures facing Australian industry.

Many sectors require dependable, around‑the‑clock energy to remain competitive and recent business closures highlight the consequences when that stability falters. In this model, advanced coal and gas technologies act as a transitional bridge through to 2040, offering firm supply while new systems scale up.

Environmental outcomes also improve early in the transition. More efficient thermal generation reduces emissions compared with older plants, while expanded firming capacity, consistent with AEMO’s planning outlook, supports a higher share of renewables over time.

Beyond that horizon, nuclear energy is positioned as a potential long‑term source of zero‑emission baseload, drawing on international examples where it has delivered stable, low‑carbon supply.

Prosperity is another pillar. A managed transition helps retain specialised skills across construction, operations and export‑linked industries, supporting regional communities that have long contributed to Australia’s energy economy.

It also creates space for emerging sectors, such as hydrogen, advanced manufacturing and defence, to grow from a more stable energy foundation.

Finally, the cost‑of‑living dimension is central. More predictable wholesale prices reduce the risk of sharp spikes and help shield families from ongoing bill increases. Stable energy costs underpin broader affordability and give households confidence to plan beyond immediate utility pressures.

Taken together, this balanced mix, transitional thermal generation, expanding renewables and a long‑term nuclear option, aims to keep all stakeholders engaged in the journey.

The alternative is continued uncertainty; the opportunity is a more resilient, more prosperous Australia over the next 15 years (one can only hope).

14. Conclusion: Choose Building Over Decline.

Australia’s industrial recovery depends on its willingness to face energy reality.

Cheap, round-the-clock electricity is not optional; it is the foundation of modern sovereignty. Without it, manufacturing, defence capability and advanced exports will diminish.

The strategic path is clear:

1.       Stabilise prices today using efficient coal, gas and hydro where viable.

2.       Rebuild the institutional and legal architecture for nuclear energy.

3.       Commit to an integrated, long-term energy strategy where renewables and nuclear coexist to restore national strength.

Every year of delay adds years to recovery. The next 15 years will determine whether Australia chooses to build power or to manage decline. With vision, pragmatism and institutional focus, this energy transition can restore Australia’s place among the world’s advanced industrial economies.

15. Bibliography.

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Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), 2024.

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CSIRO, 2025.

3.       Nuclear Power in Australia: Legal and Regulatory Barriers
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), 2024.

4.       Coal Fleet Transition: Australia’s Power System to 2040
Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, 2024.

5.       Firming the Grid: Storage and Dispatchable Power Needs
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), 2025.

6.       AUSC Coal Technology: Efficiency and Emissions
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9.       EPBC Act and Nuclear Prohibitions
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10.    ARPANS Act 1998: Nuclear Safety Framework
Australian Government, 2024.

11.    ANSTO Nuclear Capabilities Report
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12.    Global Nuclear Newcomer Timelines: Poland and Czech Republic
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2024.

13.    HELE Coal Retrofit Opportunities in Australia
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27.    ASIC Insolvency Statistics Mid-2023 to 2025[davidmagro]
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28.    Manufacturing GDP Share Record Low 2025[jaydidphoto]
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29.    Nuclear Legislation Reforms Needed[camblakephotography.com]
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      World Coal Association, 2024.